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Abstract
In the context of mobile and wireless devices, an information system is
no longer a centralized component storing all the relevant data nor is it a
decentralized component governed by a common authority. Rather, the in-
formation spread across huge numbers of autonomous mobile and wireless
devices owned by independent organizations and individuals can be regarded
as a highly dynamic, virtual information system. For this vision to become
reality, the autonomous devices involved need to be motivated to cooper-
ate. This cooperation needs to occur not only on the application layer,
but, depending on the network architecture, also on the lower layers from
the link layer on upwards. In this report, we investigate on which protocol
layers cooperation is needed and what constitutes uncooperative behavior.
We then identify necessary properties of incentive schemes that encourage
cooperation and discourage uncooperative behavior. In this context, we ex-
amine remuneration types that are a major constituent of incentive schemes.
Finally, using the example of ad hoc networks, the most challenging tech-
nical basis of a wireless information system, we compare existing incentive
schemes to these characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Not too long ago, an information system was a centralized data repository.
This is no longer true. Today, information is spread across large numbers
of autonomous devices, many of them wireless. The aim of an information
system is to provide users with access to these distributed resources. To
achieve this, cooperation among the devices becomes a necessity. On the
application layer, devices need to be willing to share the information they
possess. In order to technically accomplish this, device cooperation on lower
protocol layers may be necessary, too. Consider, e.g., an infrastructureless
ad hoc network. Here, devices must be willing to forward packets on behalf
of other devices, if cooperation on the upper layers is to be possible.
Unfortunately, in general, cooperative behavior implicates increased re-
source consumption and, thus, is not in the interest of the autonomous
devices. In case of information sharing, the offerer is confronted with ad-
ditional disc accesses as well as growing processor load. On lower network
layers, increased usage of own bandwidth and energy (e.g, on a node forward-
ing packages) prevent most of the necessary benevolent cooperation. Again,
mobile devices, which are commonly used in wireless environments, are es-
pecially concerned about saving their device-inherently scarce resources.
To counterweigh this, external incentives for cooperation are indispens-
able. These incentive schemes have to be designed in order to discourage
uncooperative behavior, while at the same time taking into account the high
heterogeneity of the devices and the resulting asymmetry of cooperation and
the fact that devices may have valid reasons for a lack of cooperation (e.g.,
a cell phone might just not be able to offer a certain service), which in this
case should not be punished by the incentive scheme.
In this report, we take a detailed look at where cooperation occurs,
what types of uncooperative behavior can be expected (and thus have to be
discouraged by appropriate incentive schemes), what should be considered
venial noncooperation (Section 2), which requirements need to be met when
devising incentive schemes (Section 3), which properties the remunerations
of incentive schemes have (Section 4), and finally, in Section 5, how existing
schemes compare to these characteristics. Lastly, we conclude the report in
Section 6.
2 Cooperative and Uncooperative Behavior of Au-
tonomous Devices
In this section, we identify protocol entities as cooperating entities. There-
fore, cooperation is classified into domains according to the layering of its
participating parties. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy of uncooperative
behavior, which enables a systematic analysis of uncooperative behavior of
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autonomous devices with regard to its cooperation domain. It is important
to have a detailed understanding of the types of uncooperative behavior in
order to conceive an effective incentive scheme. Lastly, we introduce venial
noncooperation as a kind of uncooperative behavior that should be exempted
from punishment in incentive schemes.
2.1 Cooperation Domains
As in conventional networks, cooperation takes place on different layers of
abstraction. On each layer, a device runs a protocol entity that enables
inter-device cooperation by interacting with other devices’ protocol entities.
Therefore, different domains of cooperation are discerned with respect to
the layer of their protocol. The classification of cooperation into layered
cooperation domains does not take into account cooperation within device
boundaries, because incentives are not required for vertical interaction, i.e.
interaction between different layers’ protocol entities on the same device.
A conceptual layering of cooperation domains is shown in Figure 1. Since
a domain is defined by the level of abstraction that it is built upon, there is
no conflict to existing ad hoc network protocol stacks, e.g. Bluetooth [1]. In
the following, the scope of the proposed cooperation domains is discussed.
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Figure 1: Inter-device cooperation of protocol entities
Link(L). The link layer provides peer-to-peer links between devices within
reach. Routing is confined to the network layer, so that bridges and switches
are not considered. Therefore, the link layer encompasses the LLC, MAC
and PHY of WLAN, e.g. IEEE 802.11 [2]. It corresponds to the Bluetooth
layers RF, Baseband, Link Manager and L2CAP except for the switching of
masters and bridging slaves.
Network(N). The plethora of ad hoc routing protocols [3] reside on the
network layer. In general, it offers a simple datagram service over multiple
links.
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Transport(T). The transport layer provides reliable links between de-
vices in an ad hoc network. In addition, more complex communication
patterns like multicast or anycast are provided. Currently, there is no stan-
dardized ad hoc transport protocol. However, some ad hoc routing protocols
cover parts of the transport layer, e.g. multicast in AODV.
Discovery(D). In the discovery layer, application services are advertised
by the service provider and requests for application services are processed.
Therefore, topologies for routing and matching of advertisements and re-
quests are conceived and maintained. Existing approaches for the discovery
layer employ different topologies, ranging from Bluetooth SDP’s star topol-
ogy to DIANE’s hierarchical structures [4, 5] to Allia’s [6] ad hoc topology.
Application(A). Application services are provided and consumed on the
application layer. The application protocol entities have direct access to the
discovery and transport layer. The application layer may be partitioned into
sublayers, e.g. for an internet gateway service.
User(U). The protocol entity of the user layer is represented by the device
bearer or, in case of lone devices like sensors, the device owner. The user
layer is purely conceptual, since it resides outside of the device. However,
it systematically includes user cooperation and the user interface into the
cooperation domains of Figure 1. The design of the user interface is impor-
tant, because it enables interaction between user layer and application layer
protocol entities.
2.2 Elementary Cooperation
As the elementary constituent of cooperation, an entity A acts on behalf of
an entity B. In the following, entity A is called agent entity and entity B is
referred to as principal entity. The action is part of the entities’ protocol
and is beneficial to the principal entity. For example, a network protocol
entity, i.e. the agent entity, forwards packets on behalf of its sender, i.e. the
principal entity. Therefore, the principal entity remunerates the agent entity
and, thus, stimulates the agent entity’s action. The remuneration is flexible,
if it is assessed situationally, e.g. by taking into account the scarceness of
the agent entity’s resources.
The action is not necessarily initiated by the principal. For instance,
link state packets of the network layer are sent by an agent entity to a
principal entity without the principal’s explicit request therefor. In the
following, cooperative behavior is treated on the elementary principal-agent
level. Figure 2 interrelates the proposed terms.
In a service oriented perspective, the agent entity is the provider of a
service, i.e. the action, and the principal entity is the consumer.
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2.3 Uncooperative Behavior
A taxonomy of uncooperative behavior is given in Figure 3. In this context,
profitable and reasonable applies to the uncooperative protocol entity. In
this section, we focus on unreasonable uncooperative behavior, i.e. misbe-
havior. Reasonable uncooperative behavior is termed venial noncooperation
and is discussed in Section 2.5.
misbehavior
malicious behavior
lavish behaviorselfish behavior
unprofitableprofitable
by agent by principal
profitable misbehavior
uncooperative behavior
venial noncooperation
reasonableunreasonable
Figure 3: Taxonomy of uncooperative behavior
Unprofitable misbehavior is only exhibited, if it is profitable to a pro-
tocol entity of an upper layer. For instance, in a reputation based incen-
tive scheme, posting defamation packets requires resources and, thus, is not
profitable to the network protocol entity. However, the application protocol
entity profits, if a competing service provider is excluded from the network
due to its bad reputation. Generally speaking, protocol entities are subject
to a moral hazard as it is known from the agency theory [7]. In the following,
unprofitable misbehavior is depicted as malicious behavior.
Profitable misbehavior may be exhibited by the principal or agent entity.
On the one hand, a principal entity may lavishly consume services, e.g. send
superfluous datagrams on the network layer. On the other hand, an agent
entity may fail to commit an action in order to economize its resources. For
instance, a network protocol entity may fail to forward packets.
Effective misbehavior requires vertical interaction of protocol entities.
This applies both to unprofitable and profitable misbehavior. On the one
hand, upper layers’ protocol entities have to inform the malicious protocol
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entity about its target. On the other hand, the cooperation patterns of upper
layers’ protocol entities have to be taken into account by a selfish protocol
entity. For example, a link protocol entity may save energy by turning off its
ready-to-receive state. However, it has to ensure that its network protocol
entity does not wait for a message. Furthermore, lavish behavior is only
identifiable with the aid of upper layers’ protocol entities, since lavishness
is defined by the cooperation patterns of upper layers.
We have to note that remunerating incentive schemes introduce further
means of misbehavior. For instance, malicious behavior is especially attrac-
tive, if the remuneration of the agent entity is flexible with regard to its
resources and to its market position. On the one hand, the principal entity
may maliciously prevent its agent entity to act for other principal entities
in order to economize the agent’s resources and lower its remuneration. On
the other hand, an agent entity may raise its remuneration by wiping out
its competitors, e.g. by denial of service attacks.
2.4 Misbehavior in Cooperation Domains
In each cooperation domain, the protocol entity experiences inducements to
exhibit misbehavior. However, we have to note that there are devices that
are inherently motivated to cooperate. This is especially true for cooperative
devices that cannot be reconfigured and devices with abundant energy, e.g.
lamps. In addition, application services might be for free, e.g. publicity and
public services like tourist guides.
In this section, misbehavior is listed with respect to the cooperation
domain. A detailed list of denial of service attacks in sensor networks is
found in [8]. It is focussed on malicious behavior on the link, network and
transport layer.
Misbehavior on the user layer is exempted from the following list of
misbehavior in cooperation domains, since the protocol on the user layer
is run outside of the device. However, it is important to understand the
users’ cooperation patterns, in order to employ incentives for cooperation in
a specific application domain.
Link(L). If the protocol entity ensures that no packet is waited for, it
selfishly turns off its ready-to-receive state, so that upper layers’ protocol
entities cannot act as agent any more.
Depending on the communication media, a protocol entity maliciously
prevents other protocol entities from receiving packets by jamming the me-
dia. This is advantageous in flexible remuneration schemes.
Network(N). Apart from the failure to forward packets, selfish behav-
ior varies with the network protocol. In table driven routing protocols, a
network protocol entity selfishly fails to send link state packets. If such
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behavior is retaliated by omitting the selfish entity from tables, a network
protocol entity may selfishly send link state packets that report neighbor
entities as far away. Then, no packets will be routed through the selfish en-
tity. In connection oriented network protocols, an entity selfishly refuses to
participate in routing, e.g. by ignoring a route request in DSR [9]. Further
selfish and malicious misbehavior in DSR is listed in [10].
A network protocol entity acts lavishly by establishing dispensable con-
nections or sending superfluous packets. As a prerequisite, such lavish be-
havior is at least as beneficial as its cost for the lavish entity.
As on the link layer, a network protocol entity maliciously prevents other
protocol entities from receiving packets in flexible remuneration schemes,
e.g. by returning an acknowledgement packet to the sender whilst failing
to forward. However, such misbehavior is countered by retransmission that
is generally initiated by the transport protocol entities. In table driven
routing, a network protocol entity maliciously sends link state packets that
report upper layers’ competitors as far away. Then, the malicious entity
may appear to be on the shortest route. Further malicious behavior, e.g.
a man-in-the-middle attack, may be profitable for upper layers’ protocol
entities.
Transport(T). A selfish transport protocol entity lazily handles connec-
tion management, e.g. by omitting acknowledgements for connection re-
leases and datagram reception. This behavior is only profitable, if connec-
tion management packets are not repeatedly received because of the missing
acknowledgement.
For routing in complex communication patterns like multicast, the mis-
behavior on the network layer also applies to the transport protocol entities.
Discovery(D). A discovery protocol entity selfishly drops uninteresting
advertisement. Furthermore, a selfish entity fails to forward advertisements
and requests, e.g. to competitors especially in case of flexible remuneration.
In addition, the topology is not maintained by selfish entities. For example,
a discovery protocol entity selfishly shuts downs without prior sign out.
A lavish entity frequently sends advertisements of its application ser-
vices. In case of memory shortage, it stores none of the other entities’
advertisements and, thus, frequently issues requests.
If failure to forward advertisements is retaliated, a malicious entity may
alter competitors’ advertisement, so that they become uncompetitive. In
case of flexible remuneration, the malicious entity then boosts its upper
layer’s remuneration.
Application(A). Application protocol entities selfishly do not provide
application services and, thus, do not share their resources.
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Furthermore, a lavish protocol entity consumes resource intensive appli-
cation services instead of providing them itself.
2.5 Venial Noncooperation
Venial noncooperation is defined as reasonable lack of cooperation due to
resource shortage. Persistent resource shortages arise from the limitations
of the device itself, i.e. limitations in computation, memory, bandwidth
and energy capacity. Transient resource shortages are due to the device’s
environment and usage patterns. The device might experience connectivity
problems or its resources might be overloaded, e.g. because it is a routing
bottleneck.
The incentive scheme should exempt venial noncooperation from pun-
ishment. Therefore, it is important to be able to distinguish between venial
noncooperation and the misbehavior of Section 2.3. However, the misbe-
havior in cooperation domains as listed in Section 2.4 is only distinguishable
from venial noncooperation by conceiving additional protocol mechanisms,
if it is distinguishable at all.
Flexible remuneration partially solves this problem, if the amount of
remuneration is related to the scarceness of the agent entity’s resources.
For instance, if a user is not able to recharge its device during a trip, his
device may rise the remuneration for its services in order to save energy.
On the downside, flexible remuneration has to be carefully applied, since it
encourages malicious behavior, as shown in Section 2.3 and 2.4.
In ad hoc networks, cooperation tends to asymmetry, i.e. there exist
protocol entities that are inherently principal or agent entities. This stems
from the inherent asymmetry with regard to the network’s topology and
the devices’ resources and usage patterns. Therefore, asymmetry is closely
related to venial noncooperation. However, inherent asymmetry is a problem
for incentive schemes that assume symmetric cooperation patterns, e.g. by
requiring that the principal entity has acted as agent entity before.
3 Conception and Implementation of Incentive Schemes
The goal of incentive schemes is to encourage cooperation and discourage
uncooperative behavior. In order to achieve this, incentive schemes have
to meet certain requirements. In this section, we take a look at these re-
quirements. Note that the complexity of incentive schemes arises from their
assumptions. For instance, the implementation of trust calls for additional
mechanisms.
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3.1 Effectiveness
An effective incentive scheme restrains uncooperative behavior except for
venial noncooperation. The attractiveness of selfish behavior is commonly
diminished by remunerating the agent entity. The other way round, remu-
neration of the agent entity keeps the principal entity from lavish behav-
ior. Detection and punishment of malicious behavior demand for additional
mechanisms of the incentive scheme’s implementation. Additional mecha-
nisms have to be adopted in order to detect venial noncooperation. In gen-
eral, asymmetric cooperation patterns are taken into account by applying
flexible remuneration.
3.2 Robustness
Incentive schemes are conceived in order to restrain misbehavior. However,
they allow for further selfish and malicious behavior with respect to re-
munerations. The integrity, authentication and non-repudiation properties
of a static trust infrastructure provide means for robustness against such
misbehavior. Tamper resistance might solve parts of the problem, yet its
effectiveness is contended [11].
Electronic cash calls for an oﬄine, token based and transferable elec-
tronic payment schemes, as proposed for E-Commerce [12]. Such a payment
scheme has to prevent double spending or, at least, detect it. Prevention
may be done by tamper resistant hardware or pre-authorization. Detection
is based on the traceability of double spenders. This is no contradistinction
to the anonymity of honest spenders, since this is asserted by blind signa-
tures and the cut and choose technique [13]. Transferability is a desirable
property of electronic cash. However, it is not supported by most of such
electronic payment systems [14].
3.3 Trust
Depending on the incentive scheme, trust either constitutes an incentive
for cooperation or it is a prerequisite for remuneration mechanisms. Trust
is subdivided into the principal entity’s perspective and the agent entity’s
perspective. On the one hand, the principal entity has to ensure that the
agent entity acts as specified. Furthermore, the agent should not be able to
alter or duplicate its remuneration. On the other hand, the agent entity has
to make sure that its remuneration is valid. In the following, we distinguish
between two extremes of trust, i.e. static and dynamic trust. In practice,
the trust mechanisms take advantage of both of them.
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3.3.1 Static Trust
Static trust refers to a statement of trust, i.e. a certificate, that remains
valid until it is explicitly revoked by its issuer. If trust is transitive, an
entity A trusts an entity B, if there is a certificate chain from A to B. In
[15], the transitiveness of trust and the significance of certificate chains is
discussed.
For example, the manufacturer of devices may issue a certificate of the
trustworthiness of the devices’ protocol entities. In general, a protocol entity
implicitly trusts its device’s manufacturer. If, in addition, the manufacturers
cross certify, the protocol entities of their devices trust each other.
In general, static trust is implemented within the framework of a public
key infrastructure. Apart from authentication, such an infrastructure comes
along with mechanisms that enforce integrity and non-repudiation, which is
of importance for robustness. For instance, checks are signed by the principal
entity’s private key and contain the principal entity’s public key certificate
which is issued, i.e. signed, by the manufacturer. The check appears to
be valid, if there exists a certificate chain between the agent entity and the
principal entity. On the downside, the deployment and operation of such a
public key infrastructure might be too demanding for some ad hoc networks.
3.3.2 Dynamic Trust
In contrast to certificates, dynamic trust arises from prior experiences with
an entity and continuously changes according to its behavior. The dynamic
trust that an entity A has in entity B is based on A’s own experience with
B or on other entities’ experience with B. In order to allow for the latter,
A needs a way to learn about these experiences. This can be achieved by
mechanisms for diffusion of reputation and/or by sniffing, i.e. overhearing
messages. However, diffusion paths have to be trackable in order to render
dynamic trust dependable.
3.4 Transaction
An elementary principal-agent cooperation consists of two phases. In the
negotiation phase, the participants agree on the agent’s action and assess
an arbitrary remuneration. In the processing phase, the agent executes its
action and is remunerated.
3.4.1 Negotiation
Flexible remuneration is a standard approach for overcoming inherent asym-
metry. For instance, routing might become more expensive in overloaded
parts of the network. The remuneration of an action has to be negotiated
with regard to the cost/profit ratio of the principal and agent. E.g. a PDA
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might decide to bear the costs of surfing the internet through a WLAN en-
abled gateway, while remaining disconnected of the internet in case of mobile
phone internet gateways.
In large ad hoc networks, flexible remuneration is extended to market
pricing. E.g. in ad hoc network of mobile phones, the internet gateway
service is more expensive than in an ad hoc network of WLAN enabled
laptops. On the downside, market mechanisms may be suspended by par-
ticipants that are in monopoly position for some actions.
3.4.2 Processing
Figure 2 illustrates that processing consists of an action and a remuneration.
The processing of a transaction is required to be atomic. Therefore, either
the agent executes its action and is remunerated, or neither the action nor
the remuneration takes place. Unfortunately, atomicity cannot be enforced,
since common transaction techniques assume cooperative behavior.
If action and remuneration are separable into subactions and subremu-
nerations, the risk of unfairness is considerably lowered by interleaving ac-
tion and remuneration. In general, the remuneration’s granularity is finer
and, thus, subremunerations are more feasible. For instance, the principal
may turn over half of the remuneration both before and after the agent’s ac-
tion. On the downside, the separation into subactions and subremunerations
generally implies additional overhead.
In lower cooperation domains like the network or link layer, actions and
remunerations are of lower value. However, the overhead of low value trans-
actions is considerable. For example, the forwarding of a packet on the
network layer may implicate further packets, if the forwarding protocol en-
tity is immediately remunerated. Therefore, it seems promising to aggregate
actions and remunerations into superactions and superremunerations. As a
prerequisite, the principal and actor have to participate in several transac-
tions.
The aggregation of remunerations is rendered more flexible, if flow con-
trol mechanisms are applied. For instance, outstanding remunerations may
be managed by a sliding window. In this context, flow control constitutes a
dynamic trust mechanism. It becomes particularly important, if immediate
remuneration is infeasible.
We have to note that multiparty cooperation renders processing even
more difficult.
3.5 Sniffing
As a generic protocol mechanism, sniffing allows for the collection of dy-
namic information about the ad hoc network. In certain circumstances, it
enables the observation of an entity’s behavior. Therefore, in the context of
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incentive schemes, sniffing is particularly important for dynamic trust and
venial noncooperation.
On the link layer, sniffing consists in listening to transmissions that are
destined for other devices. Therefore, link layer sniffing shortens battery
life and requires a physical interface that enforces undirected transmission.
Even so, the effectiveness of link layer sniffing cannot be guaranteed [16].
On the network layer, sniffing consists in retaining the content of for-
warded packets. In general, the content is made accessible for upper layers’
protocol entities. Since forwarding of packets is remunerated, network layer
sniffing comes at no additional costs. As an extension, a network protocol
entity may deliberately participate in several routes in order to enhance the
effectiveness of sniffing. In both cases, sniffing is an incentive for coopera-
tion.
The discussion of network layer sniffing also holds for discovery layer
sniffing.
3.6 Scalability
In the context of the taxonomy, scalability refers to the number of entities
that apply the incentive scheme. As a rule of thumb, incentive schemes do
not scale well with the number of trusted entities. For instance, payment
with electronic cash scales well, since the electronic cash issuer is the only
entity that has to be trusted.
4 Remuneration Types in Incentive Schemes
Incentive schemes ensure remuneration of the agent entity. In this sec-
tion, we identify types of remuneration as a major constituent of incentive
schemes. The most common remuneration types, i.e. reputation and checks,
are discussed with respect to their assumptions and applicability. Lastly, we
propose an abstract matching of remuneration types to cooperation domains.
4.1 Remuneration Types
In most incentive schemes, the principal entity remunerates the agent entity.
Remuneration assumes a specific form that is called remuneration type. It
differs among remunerating incentive schemes. For instance, reputation and
checks are both remuneration types.
The notion of reputation is directly related to dynamic trust. Reputa-
tion subsumes own and other entities’ experiences and, thus, constitutes the
counterpart of dynamic trust [17]. The dynamic trust that an entity A has
in entity B is based on B ’s reputation from A’s viewpoint. It is possible
to restrain lavishness by reducing the principal entity’s reputation. An en-
tity’s reputation is only remembered by entities that cooperated before as
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agent or principal and, in case of sniffing, by other entities in the proximity.
Therefore, good reputation only pays off in the presence of stable or local-
ized interaction patterns. Otherwise, reputation becomes ineffective and,
thus, agent entities are subject to adverse selection [18].
Alternatively, account based electronic payment [12] introduces checks
as remuneration type. In such incentive schemes, every entity possesses
an account on a virtual bank. The principal entity remunerates the agent
entity by issuing a check. Yet, the agent entity has to access the virtual
bank, in order to credit its account. Therefore, the accessibility of banks is
prerequisite for the application of this remuneration type. In general, the
virtual bank is distributed to a set of dedicated devices, i.e. banker nodes.
However, an account may be managed by a hardware module on the account
holder’s device. Such a module is delivered by trusted manufacturers, since
it comprises system critical functionality, i.e. the issuing and conversion of
checks. Consequently, the virtual bank is distributed among the account
holders. In any case, checks require static trust in order to be dependable.
4.2 Account based vs. reputation based incentive schemes
The applicability of the proposed remuneration types is subject to their
assumptions. Hence, incentive schemes have to consider the network’s pe-
culiarities in order to apply the appropriate reputation type.
Account based incentive schemes facilitate negotiation of the remunera-
tion, since the agent entity is aware of the check’s amount. Furthermore,
each entity is assigned an account, which allows for the conversion of remu-
nerations to real world money. Yet, account based incentive schemes require
static trust and either rely on tamper resistant hardware or on the access-
ability of banker nodes. For instance, in ad hoc networks, both assumptions
are disputable.
Reputation based incentive schemes do not make such assumptions, since
they rely on dynamic trust and, thus, couple remuneration and trust. How-
ever, the negotiation phase is omitted, since the principal entity solely as-
sesses the remuneration. Furthermore, the diffusion of reputation is delicate.
Although it improves the incentive scheme’s effectiveness, it introduces fur-
ther opportunities for misbehavior. Lastly, reputation based schemes render
convertibility impossible and therefore may hinder the deployment of com-
mercial applications.
4.3 Matching Reputation Types to Cooperation Domains
As pointed out in Section 3, two conflicting properties of incentive schemes
are discernable. On the one side, the more an incentive scheme relies on
dynamic trust the more frequently entities have to cooperate. Otherwise,
dynamic trust is not effective. On the other side, the more an incentive
12
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Figure 4: Matching reputation types to cooperation domains
scheme depends on static trust the higher its implementation costs, since a
cryptographic infrastructure is required.
As for the cooperation domains, their layering implicates two general
rules. First, the lower the cooperation domain the more frequently an el-
ementary cooperation takes place. Second, the higher the cooperation do-
main the more resource intensive the agent’s action and, thus, the higher its
remuneration is.
On the one hand, there is a direct match between the frequency of ele-
mentary cooperation and the locality required by the reputation type. On
the other hand, the actions’ counter-value and the implementation costs are
interrelated with regard to the commensurability. Consequently, it seems
promising to examine the applicability of reputation types on different co-
operation domains with regard to these two dimensions. In this context,
matching is abstract, since the specifics of the cooperation domains’ pro-
tocols are not taken into account. Figure 4 illustrates such matching of
remuneration types to cooperation domains.
As a rule of thumb, reputation based incentive schemes should be applied
to lower cooperation domains comprising the network layer. Account based
incentive schemes are suitable for upper cooperation domains comprising
the application layer. This makes sense, since application services are often
related to real world prices, as e.g. the printing service to paper and ink
prices. Nevertheless, we have to note that the illustrations of Figure 4 are
not calibrated. Hence, under certain conditions, reputation is applied on
the application layer, whereas account based incentive schemes might be
adopted on the network layer.
5 Existing Approaches for Stimulated Coopera-
tion in Ad Hoc Networks
Because of the lack of infrastructure in all of the cooperation domains, ad hoc
networks are the most challenging technical basis of a wireless information
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system. Therefore, in this section, we discuss existing incentive schemes in
ad hoc networks with respect to the characteristics of Section 3. In terms
of effectiveness, we confine the discussion to the scope of the respective
approaches, because an analysis of the approaches’ capability of effectively
restraining misbehavior requires dedicated studies.
5.1 Existing Approaches
Collective networks. Static trust is a sufficient incentive for cooperation
in all ad hoc networks within the boundaries of one organization, e.g. in mil-
itary, corporate, private and sensor ad hoc networks. Here, inter-device co-
operation is inherently motivated. The security requirements varies among
these collective networks, which is reflected by the implementation costs of
their trust mechanisms. Some collective networks apply further incentive
schemes, e.g. for load balancing.
Since collective networks attribute misbehavior to non-membership, ex-
isting approaches apply mechanisms that prevent misbehavior by excluding
non-members. An overview of such approaches is given in [19]. As a result,
collective networks interpret uncooperative behavior as venial noncoopera-
tion.
TermiNodes. The TermiNodes project [20, 21] distributes accounts to
the respective account holders. The term nuglet as virtual currency is mis-
leading, since there is no notion of token based payment [12]. There is a
clear distinction between incentives that restrain selfish and lavish behavior
by introducing two charging models, namely packet trade model and packet
purse model.
TermiNodes is focussed on incentives for packet forwarding. Therefore,
nuglets stimulate cooperation on the network layer. Additionally, the appli-
cability of the incentive scheme to multicast and, thus, cooperation on the
transport layer is considered.
Every device possesses a security module that manages its account. The
cryptographic infrastructure is deployed and operated within these security
modules. Flexible remuneration is achieved by auctions that are held within
the security modules. Yet, the conversion of nuglets to real world money is
not envisaged.
APE and RPG. In the ad hoc participation enforcement project, two
separate approaches have been proposed. The first one is the ad hoc par-
ticipation economy (APE) [22] that applies dedicated banker nodes in order
to manage accounts. Therefore, this approach renders security modules dis-
pensable, but it relies on the accessability of banker nodes. Banker nodes
facilitate the conversion of digital to real world money. In addition, the ne-
gotiation phase allows for flexible remuneration, so that asymmetry is taken
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into account. APE lays stress on misbehavior of network protocol entities.
Yet, checks are not transferable.
The second approach is the reputation participation guarantee (RPG)
[23]. It forbids diffusion of reputation. RPG is focussed on the network
layer. Selfishness is detected by sending probe packets. However, lavish and
malicious behavior is not taken into account.
Sprite. Similarly to APE, Sprite [24] relies on the accessability of banker
nodes that run a credit clearance service (CCS). The amount of remuner-
ation is assessed by such an CCS, so that the negotiation phase becomes
dispensable. It is assumed that the devices of the ad hoc network are fre-
quently connected to the internet and, thus, are able to access the CCS.
Hence, transferability of checks is not considered.
Sprite introduces a parameterized model in order to prove its effective-
ness in restraining selfish behavior on the network layer. In addition, the
model is extended to incentives for network connection establishment and
transport layer multicast.
Watchdog/Pathrater. In [16], a reputation based incentive scheme is
conceived, in order to assert availability of the ad hoc network in the presence
of selfish or malicious behavior. Hence, the incentive scheme is applied on
the network layer.
Misbehaving protocol entities are excluded from network connections by
a watchdog and pathrater run by each device. Reputation is diffused by
watchdog synchronization. It is assumed that watchdogs are able to listen
promiscuously, i.e. sniffing is assumed. Furthermore, lavish behavior is not
restrained, since a selfish protocol entity with bad reputation is still able to
act as principal.
CONFIDANT. The watchdog/pathrater approach excludes misbehav-
ing protocol entities from network connections, which is beneficial for self-
ish protocol entities. Therefore, the CONFIDANT protocol [25] addition-
ally prevents misbehaving protocol entities from acting as principal entity.
Therefore, selfish behavior is restrained.
CORE. CORE [9] is reputation based and lays stress on network level
selfishness. Defamation is avoided by restricting diffusion to positive local
reputations. Nevertheless, unjustified praising is still possible.
5.2 Summary
The choice of an appropriate incentive scheme depends on the character-
istics and constraints of the respective information system. Therefore, the
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Table 1: Evaluation of existing approaches in ad hoc networks
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evaluation of existing approaches in ad hoc networks is summarized in Table
1.
Apparently, the approaches focus on the network cooperation domain.
This stems from the relative matureness of network protocols compared to
transport, discovery and application protocols in ad hoc networks. How-
ever, the discussion of Section 2.4 points out the need for approaches that
encompass the discovery and application domain.
Even though every approach is conceived in order to restrain selfishness,
existing reputation based schemes do not consider lavish behavior. For ap-
proaches that do not take malicious behavior into account, it is argued that
malicious behavior is not profitable and, thus, is not part of the incentive
scheme. However, in Section 2, we indicated that a protocol entity’s mali-
cious behavior may be profitable for upper layers’ protocol entities. There-
fore, malicious behavior has to be taken into consideration, in particular for
approaches that are focussed on lower cooperation domains.
None of the existing approaches applies mechanisms of the processing
phase, as proposed in Section 3, i.e. subdivision, aggregation and flow con-
trol of remunerations.
Obviously, the approaches may be classified with regard to their remu-
neration type. The pros and cons of the respective approaches stem from
the characteristics of their remuneration types, as shown in Section 4.
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6 Conclusion
Infrastructureless information systems of autonomous devices can only func-
tion properly, if the participating devices exhibit cooperative behavior. There-
fore, we identified and classified cooperative and uncooperative behavior of
autonomous devices on different protocol layers. Furthermore, we discussed
key conceptual and implementation issues of incentive schemes. In this con-
text, we identified remuneration types as a major constituent of incentive
schemes. Consequently, we reviewed and classified existing approaches for
stimulated cooperation in ad hoc networks.
In the future, we intend to conceive an incentive scheme on the discovery
and application layer for our research project DIANE [4]. In this context,
the design space of incentive schemes and inter-domain cooperation have to
be thoroughly examined.
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Glossary
Action (Handlung): A resource consuming activity which is beneficial
for another device
Agent: An entity that commits an action
Assessment (Bewertung): Part of the negotiation phase which assesses
actions and remunerations
Consumer (Verbraucher): The principal entity of an action in the ap-
plication cooperation domain
Cooperation (Kooperation): Inter-device (horizontal) collaboration that
is aimed at maintaining the infrastructure or at adequately accessing the dis-
tributed resources
Cooperation domain (Kooperationsdoma¨ne): Inter-device coopera-
tion within a conceptual layer (link, network, transport, discovery, applica-
tion, user)
Cooperation pattern (Kooperationsmuster): Symmetric iff there is
no inherent agent/principal
Diffusion (Zerstreuung): Informing other entities about the local view
of a protocol entity’s reputation
Effectiveness (Effektivita¨t): (of an incentive scheme) The capability of
restraining misbehavior while exempting venial noncooperation
Flexible remuneration (Flexible Belohnung): see pricing
Inherent agent/principal (Inha¨renter Agent/Prinzipal): Due to in-
herent asymmetry, an entity acts preferably as principal or agent.
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Inherent asymmetry (Inha¨rente Asymmetrie): Arises from the net-
work’s topology, the devices’ resources or usage patterns and induces asym-
metric cooperation patterns.
Lavish behavior (Verschwenderisches Verhalten): Profitable misbe-
havior that is exhibited by the principal entity
Malicious behavior (Bo¨swilliges Verhalten): Unprofitable misbehav-
ior that is exhibited by the agent or principal entity
Misbehavior (Fehlverhalten): Uncooperative behavior that is unrea-
sonable, i.e. that is not interpreted as venial noncooperation
Negotiation (Verhandlung): The first phase of a transaction; the par-
ticipants agree on the agent’s action and assess an appropriate remuneration
Pricing (Preisfindung): Flexible assessment of the agent’s remunera-
tion; takes into account the scarceness of resources and the market position
of the participants
Principal (Prinzipal): An entity on the behalf of which is committed an
action
Processing (Bearbeitung): The second phase of a transaction; the agent
executes its action and is remunerated
Provider (Anbieter): The agent entity of an action in the application
cooperation domain
Remuneration (Belohnung/Verdienst): Compensates the agent for
having consumed its resources; handed over by the principal
Remuneration type (Belohnungsart): The means of remuneration (rep-
utation, action in return, check)
Resource (Ressource): Hardware resources (energy, bandwidth, mem-
ory, computation, specific resources)
Robustness (Robustheit): The capability of overcoming misbehavior
that is targeted at the incentive scheme itself
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Scalability (Skalierbarkeit): The capability of an incentive scheme of
being applicable, even if the number of entities it encompasses grows large
Selfish behavior (Eigensinniges Verhalten): Profitable misbehavior
that is exhibited by the agent entity
Service (Dienst): An action within the application cooperation domain
Sniffing (Schnu¨ffeln): Listening to messages or negotiations that are
destined for other entities
Stimulated cooperation (Angeregte Koooperation): A composition
of elementary stimulated cooperations
Transaction (Transaktion): The two-phase execution of an elementary
principal-agent cooperation.
Trust (Vertrauen): Either an incentive for cooperation or a prerequisite
for remuneration mechanisms; accrues from certificates (static trust) or prior
experiences (dynamic trust)
Uncooperative behavior (Unkooperatives Verhalten): The lack or
absence of cooperation
User interface (Benutzerschnittstelle): A means of service consump-
tion by the user
Venial noncooperation (Verzeihliches Fehlverhalten): Uncoopera-
tive behavior that is reasonable, i.e. other entities are appreciative of it
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